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ABSTRACT
METAMORPHIC WORM THAT CARRIES ITS OWN MORPHING ENGINE
by Sudarshan Madenur Sridhara
Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure across generations, but
its functionality remains unchanged. Well-designed metamorphic malware will evade
signature detection. Recent research has revealed techniques based on hidden
Markov models (HMMs) for detecting many types of metamorphic malware, as well
as techniques for evading such detection.
A worm is a type of malware that actively spreads across a network to other
host systems. In this project we design and implement a prototype metamorphic
worm that carries its own morphing engine. This is challenging, since the morphing
engine itself must be morphed across replications, which imposes significant
restrictions on the structure of the worm. Our design also employs previously
developed techniques to evade detection. We provide test results to confirm that
this worm effectively evades signature and HMM-based detection, and we consider
possible detection strategies. This worm provides a concrete example that should
prove useful for additional malware detection research.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Metamorphism is the process of transforming a piece of software into unique
instances [20]. In metamorphic software, copies of the software are functionally
equivalent but their internal structure differs. Metamorphism is used by virus
writers to avoid detection by antivirus software which primarily use signature based
detection techniques [2].
Metamorphism provides virus writers the opportunity to develop malware
that is undetectable, with respect to static analysis [10]. Therefore, it is natural to
expect an increase in volume as well as complexity of metamorphic viruses in the
near future.
Although metamorphic viruses have been extensively studied
[1, 6, 12, 18, 25, 26, 30], a metamorphic worm presents significant challenges.
Metamorphic viruses do not need to carry their own morphing engine. In the case of
some highly metamorphic viruses, such as NGVCK [19], the metamorphic generator
is separate from the virus body.
Unlike viruses, worms are self-propagating [2], and therefore a metamorphic
worm would, most likely, need to carry its own morphing engine. Since the
morphing engine itself can act as a signature, a worm that carries its own morphing
engine must morph its own morphing engine, as well as the actual worm code,
across replications. This presents significant complications and imposes some
restrictions on the structure of the morphing engine.
In this paper, we develop and analyze a worm that carries its own morphing
engine. That is, the morphing engine morphs itself and the worm across replications.
1

The resulting metamorphic worms are evaluated based on the lack of similarity
between successive generations [14] and their ability to evade detection [30].

2

CHAPTER 2
Malware types and detection techniques

Malware is a term used to refer to software with malicious functionality.
Malware can exist as an independent executable or infect a benign executable by
becoming a part of it. There are different kinds of malware, primarily distinguished
from one another by their methods of replication and infection [2].
2.1

Malware types
We discuss two of the most prominent kinds of malware: viruses and worms.

Each one of these types is explained in more detail in the sections that follow.
2.1.1

Viruses

A Virus is a malicious piece of code that tries to attach itself to other
executable code upon execution. The executable file to which the virus successfully
attaches to, is said to be “infected” [2]. Viruses employ numerous methods to
escape detection by common detection methods like signature based detection. The
most prominent methods used for this purpose are encryption, polymorphism and
metamorphism [2].
2.1.1.1

Encrypted viruses

Most of the executable portion of an encrypted virus is encrypted. A small
block of decryptor code exists in the virus to decrypt its encrypted body, when the
virus is being executed. Encryption using different keys defeats signature based
detection by not providing a common signature that can be used to detect the virus.
3

However, the decryptor remains constant across generations, because of which, the
code pattern of the decryptor can be used for detection.

2.1.1.2

Polymorphic viruses

A polymorphic virus is essentially an encrypted virus which changes its
decryptor loop across generations. A polymorphic virus, theoretically, has an
infinite number of variations of the decryptor loop and therefore, has no common
part in the virus body across replications [2].
The most common method to detect polymorphic viruses is code emulation.
Although the decryptor changes across replications, the encrypted body will result
in the same block of code once decrypted. This enables in memory detection of the
virus, once the decryptor has performed the decryption.

2.1.1.3

Metamorphic viruses

Metamorphic viruses do not use encryption and decryptor functions. Instead,
the entire body of the virus is changed across generations, while retaining
functionality. This produces a new virus body for each replication.
A key component of metamorphic viruses is a mutation engine [15]. The
mutation engine is responsible for morphing the body of the metamorphic virus
across generations. The mutation engine can be independent of the resultant
metamorphic virus, or it can be stored as part of the virus body. In the former case
a higher degree of metamorphism can be achieved because the mutation engine itself
need not be morphed. In the latter case, the mutation engine itself needs to be
morphed across generations. This places restrictions on the structure of the
mutation engine, and also the level of metamorphism that can be achieved using it
[7, 28].
4

Some of the morphing techniques employed by metamorphic viruses are
explained in more detail in the Chapter 3.

2.1.2

Worms

Like viruses, worms are self-replicating malware. However, there are several
characteristics that distinguish a worm from a virus.
Firstly, worms are standalone [2]. They do not rely on a host executable to
which they need to attach to. Secondly, unlike viruses which only replicate and
infect executable programs within their host machine, worms spread from host to
host across the network. Worms also operate without human intervention [22].
Similar to viruses, worms can employ different techniques to avoid signature
based detection. Polymorphism and metamorphism have been employed by worms
[3, 7].
2.2

Detection techniques
As viruses continue to evolve, there has been a corresponding evolution in

virus detection technologies as well. This section presents some techniques that
antivirus software most commonly employ. Some niche techniques are also
presented.

2.2.1

Signature-based detection

Signature-based detection is by far, the most commonly used technique for
virus detection [23]. A signature comprises of sequences of bytes extracted from a
virus, which can be used to uniquely identify the virus. A signature scanner scans
executable files for such signatures, using a database of virus signatures [2]. If a

5

match occurs, the executable is assumed to be infected by the virus corresponding
to the matching signature.
Signature scanning is implemented using algorithms that can be used to scan
for a large number of signatures quickly. However, there are several drawbacks in
signature based detection. To be able to detect new virus, a signature needs to be
extracted from the virus and added to the signature database. Also, signature based
scanning is easily defeated by using techniques like polymorphism and
metamorphism [23].

2.2.2

Anomaly-based detection

Heuristic methods can be employed by anti-virus software to detect
anomalous behavior, instead of looking for specific virus signatures. Heuristic
methods can be either static or dynamic. Static heuristics involve static code
analysis to look for suspicious structures like decryption loops, self-modifying code,
use of undocumented API calls, manipulation of interrupt vectors, etc. [2, 27].
Dynamic heuristic methods determine whether an executable is infected by
analyzing its behavior while it is running. Common dynamic methods are behavior
monitoring and code emulation [27].
Anomaly-based detection systems can provide protection against zero-day
attacks by detecting even unknown viruses. However, anomaly-based detection
systems have much higher false positive and false negative rates compared to other
detection methods [9].

2.2.3

Integrity checkers

Integrity checkers detect changes to files by comparing their check-sum to
their original check-sum stored in a white list. Viruses, with very few exceptions,
6

operate by changing files. Integrity checkers watch for unauthorized file
modifications to determine virus like behavior [4].

2.2.4

Hidden Markov Model based detection

Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are statistical models, widely used in many
problems involving pattern recognition. In the past few years, considerable research
has been done on the use of Hidden Markov Models for metamorphic virus
detection. A method to detect metamorphic viruses is presented in [30]. It involves
training an HMM with opcode sequences extracted from viruses belonging to a
certain family. This trained HMM is then used to score other executable files, to
check whether they belong to the same virus family. A detailed explanation of the
process is given in Section 5.2.

7

CHAPTER 3
Metamorphic techniques

The metamorphic worm described in this paper makes use of morphing
techniques like equivalent instruction substitution and dead code insertion. Apart
from these two techniques, there are a number of other morphing techniques
employed by metamorphic malware. These techniques may be as elementary as
equivalent instruction substitution, or as advanced as formal grammar mutation.
Some of the metamorphic techniques presented in [2] and [3] are explained in
this section.
3.1

Register Swap
Register swap is a simple metamorphic technique. It mutates the virus body

by swapping the operand registers with different registers. For example, POP ECX
might be replaced with POP EBX, if it is permissible. Opcode sequence remains the
same using this technique.
3.2

Subroutine permutation
In this technique changes in the structure of a virus is obtained by reordering

the virus’ subroutines. If a virus has n different subroutines, then it can generate
n-factorial different generations without repeats. Viruses which only use this
method may be detected matching multiple short signatures in the same binary. An
example of one such permutation is shown in Figure 3.1.

8

Figure 3.1: Subroutine permutation [24]
3.3

Garbage Instruction Insertion
Garbage instructions are instructions are of two types:

(1) Instructions that are either not executed
(2) Instructions that have no effect.
By adding garbage instructions, a virus can potentially generate an unlimited
number of unique copies. Examples of instructions that have no effect include NOP,
ADD EAX, 0, etc. Such instructions can contribute greatly to metamorphism.
3.4

Instruction substitution
This involves substituting a single instruction or a group of instructions with

another instruction or a group of instructions with the same functionality. For
instance, MOV R1, R2 is equivalent to PUSH R1 followed by POP R2.

9

3.5

Transposition
Transposition involves instruction re-ordering. If instructions have no

dependency between them, their order of execution can be changed without any
change in the overall functionality of the program. For example, instructions:
1: ADD [Op1], [Op2]
2: ADD [Op3], [Op4]
can be re-ordered as shown below without any resultant change in functionality.
1: ADD [Op3], [Op4]
2: ADD [Op1], [Op2]
The same is true for groups of instructions which have no dependency on one
another. This helps to evade signature based detection, as the order of instruction
bytes change in the morphed executable.
3.6

Formal grammar mutation
Formal grammar mutation is a formalization of many existing morphing

techniques [3, 8, 31]. Classical morphing engines can be viewed as non-deterministic
automata, since transitions are possible from every symbol to every other symbol
[31], where the symbol set is the set of all possible instructions. In other words, any
instruction can be followed by any other instruction. By formalizing mutation
techniques, one can apply formal grammar rules and create viral copies with great
variation.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a simple polymorphic decryptor template and two
possible mutations of the decryptor code achieved using the formal grammar shown

10

in Figure 3.3. With this decryptor template and formal grammar combination, it is
possible to generate 960 different decryptors [31].

Figure 3.2: A simple polymorphic decryptor and two variants [31]

Figure 3.3: Formal grammar for decrpytor mutation [31]
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CHAPTER 4
Binary similarity

The ability of the metamorphic worm described in this paper to evade
signature-based detection, is evaluated by analyzing the similarity between various
generations of the worm.
4.1

N-gram similarity
In [14], an n-gram based similarity measure is proposed and analyzed. This

method can be used to compare sequences of instructions in two assembly program
files [12, 30]. This method calculates a score that represents the percentage of
similarity between the two files. The method is summarized below:
(1) Extract instruction opcodes from the two given assembly programs X and
Y. Let the length of the extracted opcode sequences from programs X and
Y be ‘m’ and ‘n’ respectively. Assign numbers in a sequence to the
extracted opcodes: 1 to the first opcode, 2 to the second opcode, etc.
(2) For all opcode sub-sequences of length three from X’s opcode sequence,
check if corresponding sub-sequences occur in the opcode sequence
extracted from Y. If a match occurs, (x, y) will be marked on a graph
where, x is the position of the first opcode of the matching sub-sequence in
Xs opcode sequence, and y is the position of the first opcode in the
matching sub-sequence in Y’s opcode sequence.
(3) After matching all opcode sequences, an m x n graph is plotted on which all
matching sub-sequences are marked. The x-axis corresponds to the opcode
12

numbers extracted from X and the y-axis corresponds to the opcode
numbers extracted from Y. Retain only those line segments on the graph
whose length is above a certain threshold value (say five). This is done to
eliminate random matches and noise.
(4) Since a sequential match is done between both sequences, matching
sequences of opcodes result in line segments that are parallel to the diagonal
((0,0), (m,n)). If the matching sequence occurs in the same starting location
in both opcode sequences, the resulting line segment will fall on the
diagonal. If the matching sequence occurs at different starting locations in
both opcode sequences, the resulting line segment will be parallel to the
diagonal.
(5) For each axis, calculate the sum of the number of opcodes that are covered
by one or more of the line segments retained in (3). This sum is divided by
the total number of opcodes on the corresponding axis to find the
percentage of match for the assembly program represented by the axis. The
final similarity score is the average of the similarity percentage calculated
for both axes.
The method summarized above is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.1.
This n-gram based similarity measure is used both in [30] and [12], to compare
the similarity between assembly programs that are obtained by disassembling
benign files of viruses belonging to the NGVCK family.
An example comparison between two virus files, generated by the NGVCK
metamorphic generator [19], presented in [30] is shown in Figure 4.2. The left part
of the graph shows matching sub-sequences without eliminating noise. The right
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Figure 4.1: Similarity based on n-gram analysis [14]
part shows matching sub-sequences retained after eliminating noise. The final
similarity score in this particular instance is 21%.

Figure 4.2: n-gram similarity of two NGVCK viruses [30]

4.2

Similarity using graph technique
A method for measuring similarity between executable files using opcode

graphs is presented in [18]. This method involves creating weighted directed graphs

14

using opcodes extracted from executable files. We now summarize the methods used
to generate opcode graphs, and to compute similarity using these generated graphs.
4.2.1

Opcode graphs

Each opcode that appears in an executable file’s extracted opcode sequence is
a node in the directed graph. A directed edge is inserted from this node to every
other node corresponding to the successor opcodes. Edge weights represent the
transition probabilities to successor nodes.
Counts for opcode pairs are tabulated from the extracted opcode sequence to
form a matrix. For each opcode, the counts are converted to probabilities by
dividing the count for a digram by the row sum. The resulting matrix is an opcode
graph that represents the program using which it was created.
4.2.2

Similarity Score

Let N be the number of distinct opcodes. The opcodes are mapped to
numbers 0 to N − 1. Let A and B be the opcode graphs for the executable files in
question. Elements of the matrices A and B are represented by aij and bij
respectively.
To compare the matrices, the similarity score S(A, B) is computed using the
following scoring function:
1
S(A, B) = 2
N

N
−1
X

!2
|aij − bij |

i,j=0

If A is the same as B, then the minimal score of 0 is obtained. On the other
hand, if aij = 1 and bik = 1 with j 6= k, the maximum possible row sum of 2 is
obtained. If this maximum row sum is obtained for each row, S(A, B) = 4.
Therefore, 0 ≤ S(A, B) ≤ 4.
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CHAPTER 5
Hidden Markov Models and virus detection

Over the past few years, there has been significant research on the use of
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) for metamorphic virus detection
[1, 6, 12, 18, 25, 26, 30]. A method is presented in [30] in which an HMM is trained
using sequences of opcodes from viruses that belong to a particular family. This
trained HMM is then used to score binaries, to determine whether the binaries are
viruses that belong to the same family. A threshold can be obtained based on the
Log Likelihood Per Opcode (LLPO) score for viruses and benign binaries, which is
used to categorize new binaries as viruses or benign binaries based on their LLPO
score. This section explains how HMMs work and the way HMMs can be used in
virus detection.
5.1

Hidden Markov Models
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical model used to model a

Markov process whose states are unknown [21]. Some HMM notations are now
presented. The notations presented here are based on the notations used in [21]:
T → Length of the observation sequence
N → Number of states in the model
M → Number of observation symbols
Q → {q0 , q1 , . . . , qN −1 } − Number of observation symbols
V → {0, 1, . . . , M − 1} − Set of possible observations
A → state transition probabilities
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B → observation probability matrix
π → initial state distribution
O → (O0 , O1 , . . . , OT −1 ) − observation sequence
Figure 5.1 illustrates a generic HMM. The state of the HMM and the
observation at time t are represented by Xt and Ot respectively. The initial state X0
and the A matrix determine the hidden Markov process which is represented in the
figure by the portion on top of the dotted line.

Figure 5.1: Generic Hidden Markov Model

First, the HMM is trained using input data that the HMM needs to represent.
Each individual element in the training data maps to an observation symbol.
Unique observation symbols are extracted from the set of observations. The trained
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model will then be used to determine if a given new sequence of observations is a
pattern similar to the one represented by the model.

5.1.1

An example

Here we illustrate the inner workings of an HMM using a simple example [17].
A genie is sitting behind a curtain with urns U0 , U1 and U2 , each containing balls
colored red, green and blue in different proportions. Balls colored red, green and
blue are indicated by R, G and B respectively. The color of the ball chosen by the
genie, at any point of time, is governed by a Markov process unknown to the
observer. The observer can only see the color of the chosen ball.
The objective is to predict the urn from which the balls are retrieved based on
the order and color of the balls drawn from them. In this example, U0 , U1 and U2
are the states. The possible observations are R, G and B.
The transition probabilities from each state to every other state are
represented by matrix A as shown below:
U0

U0 0.1
A= 

U1 
0.6

U2 0.5

U1 U2

0.4 0.5

0.2 0.2


0.2 0.3

The probability of observations for each of the states is represented by the B
matrix as shown below:
R

U0 0.5
B= 

U1 
0.2

U2 0.1

G B

0.3 0.2

0.6 0.2


0.3 0.6
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Also, the initial probability distribution is represented by the π matrix as
shown below:




π = 0.4 0.3 0.3
The matrices π, A and B are row-stochastic; i.e, each row sums up to 1. Each
row represents a probability distribution. Now, given a sequence of observations O
= (R, B), the objective is to find the most likely state sequence, given the model λ.
In the HMM sense, the most likely state sequence is calculated choosing the
state for which the sum of probabilities over all possible state sequences is the
highest for each observation. This process is illustrated in Table 5.1. In this case,
the optimal state sequence in the HMM sense is U0 U2 .
Table 5.1: Finding HMM optimal state sequence
State sequence probabilities
State Probability Normalized
probability
U0 U0
0.0040
0.0376
U0 U1
0.0160
0.1504
U0 U2
0.0600
0.5639
U1 U0
0.0072
0.0677
U1 U1
0.0024
0.0226
U1 U2
0.0072
0.0677
U2 U0
0.0030
0.0282
U2 U1
0.0012
0.0113
U2 U2
0.0054
0.0508
HMM probabilities
Element
1
2
P (U0 ) 0.7519
0.1335
P (U1 ) 0.1580
0.1843
P (U2 ) 0.0903
0.6824
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5.2

The three problems
The following three problems can be solved efficiently using HMMs [21].

(1) Given λ = (A, B, π) and O, the observation sequence, find P (O|λ).
(2) Given λ = (A, B, π) and O, the observation sequence, find the optimal
state sequence for the Markov process.
(3) Given O, the number of unique symbols M and the number of states N ,
find λ.
Problem 1 involves to determining the likelihood of an observation sequence
using the model. Problem 2 deals with uncovering the “hidden” part of the HMM.
Problem 3 deals with training the HMM using the given observation sequence O
and the parameters M and N .
In this paper we will be dealing with problem 1 and 3. We will make use of
methods to solve problem 3 to train a HMM using opcode sequences extracted from
executable files. Scoring opcode sequences to be tested using this model involves
solving problem 1. We will not be dealing with problem 2, as previous research
indicates that the meaning of the HMM states themselves has not been of much
consequence to the detection capability of the HMM [12, 30].
5.2.1

Forward Algorithm

The forward algorithm or α pass is used to determine P (O|λ).
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
αt (i) = P (O0 , O1 , . . . , Ot , xt = qi |λ)
The probability of the partial observation sequence up to time t is αt (i).
Using the forward algorithm, P (O|λ) can be computed as shown below:
20

(1) Let α0 (i) = πi bi (O0 ), for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
(2) For t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
"N −1
#
X
αt (i) =
αt−1 (j)aji bi (Ot ).
j=0

(3) P (O|λ) =

N
−1
X

αT −1 (i).

i=0

5.2.2

Backward Algorithm

Backward algorithm or β pass can be used to determine the most likely state
sequence.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
βt (i) = P (Ot+1 , Ot+2 , . . . , OT −1 |xt = qi , λ)
Then, βt (i) can be computed efficiently as shown below:
(1) Let βT −1 (i) = 1, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
(2) For t = T − 2, T − 3, . . . , 0, and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
βt (i) =

N
−1
X

aij bj (Ot+1 )βt+1 (j).

j=0

For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
γt (i) = P (xt = qi |O, λ).
Since the relevant probability up to time t is measured by αt (i), and the
relevant probability after time t is measured by βt (i),
γt (i) =

αt (i)βt (i)
.
P (O|λ)

From the definition of γt (i), the most likely state at any time t is the state for
which γt (i) is maximum.
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5.2.3

Baum-Welch Algorithm

This algorithm adjusts model parameters to best-fit the observations. The
number of states N and the number of unique observations symbols M are fixed.
However, the contents of the A, B and π are free, subject only to the row stochastic
condition. The re-estimation process is explained below:
(1) Initialize λ = (A, B, π) with an approximate guess. If no such guess is
possible, use random values. For example πi = 1/N , Aij = 1/N , Bij = 1/M .
(2) Compute αt (i), βt (i), γt (i) and γt (i, j) where γt (i, j) is a di-gamma.
Di-gammas can be defined as:
γt (i) =

αt (i)aij bj (Ot+1 )βt+1 (j)
P (O|λ)

The γt (i) and γt (i, j) (or di-gamma) are related by
γt (i) =

N
−1
X

γt (i, j)

j=0

(3) Re-estimate model parameters as follows: For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 let
πi = γ0 (i)
For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
aij =

T −2
X

γt (i, j)

/

t=0

T −2
X

γt (i)

t=0

For j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and k = 0, 1, . . . , M − 1, compute
bj (k) =

X

γt (j)

/

T −2
X
t=0

t∈{0,1,...,T −2},Ot =k

(4) If P (O|λ) increases, go to step 3.
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γt (j)

5.3

HMMs and Virus detection
The use of HMMs for metamorphic virus detection is explained in great detail

in [29, 30]. The basic objective is to train an HMM using opcodes extracted from
viruses belonging to a particular family. The trained HMM will, in effect, represent
the statistical properties of the virus family. Using this trained HMM, we can
compute a score for any given program to determine how “close” the file is to the
virus family that the HMM represents. We can then classify the file based on a
predetermined threshold.
First, a collection of viruses belonging to the same family are disassembled.
From each of the disassembled files, only the instruction opcodes are extracted. An
example of extracted opcodes is shown in Figure 5.2. Opcodes sequences extracted
from all the virus files are concatenated. This concatenated sequence forms the
sequence observations used to train an HMM. The set of unique opcodes in the
observation sequence is the set of distinct observation symbols.
An HMM is now trained using this sequence of observations, as explained in
Section 5.1.1. To detect whether a given program belongs to the virus family, this
trained HMM is used to calculate the Log Likelihood per Opcode (LLPO). If the
LLPO of the program is within a particular threshold, the file is classified as
belonging to the virus family. We now take a briefly look at what Log Likelihood
Per Opcode means.

5.3.1

Log Likelihood Per Opcode

Scoring observation sequences and training the HMM involves computation of
product of probabilities. The result of multiplication tends to 0 exponentially as T
increases. As a result, the use of methods described in Section 5.2 inevitably results
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Figure 5.2: Extracted opcode sequence
in underflow. To avoid this problem, the forward and backward algorithms
normalize the result of each iteration. This process is called scaling. HMM scaling is
explained in detail in [21].
Once scaling is employed, P (O|λ) is redefined as:
T −1

P (O|λ) = 1

/ Yc

j

j=0

where cj is the scaling factor at time j. However, this computation is also
susceptible to underflow and to avoid that, we compute:
log[P (O|λ)] = −

T −1
X

log cj

j=0

This is the log likelihood. Log likelihood is length dependent, as the sum of
log transition probabilities and log observation probabilities will be higher for a
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longer sequence. As the sequences in the test set may be of different lengths
compared to the sequences used to train the model, log likelihood is divided by the
number of opcodes in the sequence to obtain Log Likelihood Per Opcode which
accounts for the length difference [30].

5.3.2

Effectiveness of HMM detection

HMM detection has proven to be very effective in detection of highly
metamorphic viruses [30]. Experiments with HMM detection in [29] indicate a
detection rate of about 90% and a false positive rate of less than 10%.
5.4

Evading HMM detection
There has been some research on methods to evade HMM detection [12]. The

method presented in [12] involves inserting dead code from the benign files in the
test set, into the virus files. This helps in making the virus files statistically similar
to normal files. This is achieved by making use of a dynamic scoring algorithm
which inserts a block of dead code only if it results in the virus file becoming more
similar [14] to normal files.
Results presented in [11] indicate that, with an increase in the amount of dead
code inserted from normal files, the average LLPO scores for viruses and normal
files become closer. The HMM-detector showed indications of failing when 5% of the
subroutines were copied from the normal file. The LLPO scores for viruses and
normal files were the closest when 35% dead blocks and 30% subroutines were
copied from normal files.
Results in [11] also indicate that inserting long sequences of opcodes, like
subroutines, are more effective in defeating HMM detection than randomly inserted
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blocks of dead code. The worm presented in this paper makes use of this result
while inserting dead code.
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CHAPTER 6
Design and implementation

We have implemented a metamorphic worm that carries its own morphing
engine. As mentioned above, this presents a significant challenge since both the
worm body and the morphing engine itself must be morphed. This section presents
the structure of our metamorphic worm in detail.
6.1

Structure
Figure 6.1 illustrates the structure of the various components of the worm.

The worm consists of the following:
(1) Body - This is the central component that controls the worm’s life cycle. It
controls and coordinates the activities of all the other active components of
the worm.
(2) Disassembler - Disassembles the binary portion of the worm and extracts
instructions from it.
(3) Morphing Engine - The morphing engine operates on the set of
disassembled instructions. It removes old dead code instructions, adds new
dead code and employs equivalent instruction substitution.
(4) Reassembler - The reassembler re-structures the control flow in the morphed
body of code and converts the morphed body to binary.
(5) Payload - This is the actual piece of code the worm is intended to run on
every computer it infects. In our case, the payload is benign; it simply
27

appends a line of text to a temporary file.
(6) Pad block 1 and Pad block 2 (Padding blocks) - These are blocks of dead
code that are replaced from generation to generation. The purpose of doing
this is to make the worm statistically similar to normal files and thereby
evade HMM detection. The blocks also help to avoid relocating sections and
other book-keeping information in the executable from generation to
generation [12].

Figure 6.1: Metamorphic worm components
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6.2

Memory Layout
We now examine the layout of different components of the worm in the

address space of the worm’s process. The placement of the worm in memory is
illustrated in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Metamorphic worm memory layout

6.3

Metamorphic techniques used
The worm uses two of the metamorphic techniques described in Chapter 3.

Specifically, the worm uses equivalent instruction substitution and garbage code
insertion.
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6.3.1

Equivalent instruction substitution

The primary candidates for morphing are the MOV and the XOR instructions.
The former because, it appears in abundance in binaries, and the latter because it is
a usual candidate for substituting the MOV instruction and hence needs to be
substituted back.
After the disassembler has disassembled the worm-portion of the worm’s
executable image, the instructions are scanned for possible equivalent instructions
to be substituted, by the morphing engine. These instructions are substituted by
equivalent instructions with a fixed probability. This is achieved using a
substitution table as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Equivalent instruction table
Instruction
0x48 0x89 0xc3
0x48 0x89 0xc1

Equivalent
0x48 0x31 0xdb 0x48 0x01 0xc3
0x48 0x31 0xc9 0x48 0x01 0xc1
...

Action
NULL
NULL

The first column of each of the first two rows in Table 6.1 correspond to
instructions MOV %RAX,%RBX and MOV %RAX,%RCX respectively. The second column
of the first two rows correspond to instructions XOR %RBX,%RBX; ADD %RAX,%RBX
and XOR %RBX,%RCX; ADD %RAX,%RCX respectively. The “Action” field in table is
the address of a label inside the morphing function which performs actions specific
to the instructions that were substituted. It is NULL if no specific action is necessary.
A complete list of equivalent instructions that are substituted by the
morphing engine is in Appendix A.
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6.3.2

Dead code insertion

Dead instruction insertion involves inserting instructions which do not result
in any change in data, or the contents of general purpose registers. The sole purpose
of adding these instructions is to increase the diversity of instructions.
However, the effect of such instructions on the RFLAGS register should be
carefully considered as they might have adverse effects on control flow. Control flow
instructions use bits in the RFLAGS register to decide which code path to take. If a
dead code instruction which manipulates RFLAGS is inserted before a control flow
instruction, it can have an adverse effect on the result of executing the next control
flow instruction.
Examples for dead code instructions include ADD $0x0,%RAX, SUB $0x0,%RBX,
XOR $0x0,%RAX, etc. The complete list of dead code instructions used by the worm
is in Appendix B.
6.4

Functionality
A characteristic feature of metamorphic malware which carry their own engine

is that the actual “payload” part of the worm will be much smaller than the overall
size of the worm. In the case of our worm, the payload is benign and merely
appends some text to the end of a temporary file. The worm’s functionality is
summarized by the Algorithm below:
Run ‘‘payload’’

// Actual intent of the worm

Open own binary image from disk by reading /proc/self/exe

Read worm data and book-keeping data from its ‘‘.data’’ section
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Disassemble worm body excluding padding blocks:
For each disassembled instruction:
Add a unique label and store virtual address

Build symbol table:
For each disassembled instruction INS:
if control flow instruction
add (INS.label, INS.target.label) to symbol table

Morph:
Initialize substitution and dead code instruction tables
For each disassembled instruction INS:
if INS is a dead instruction:
if INS is a control flow target
(determined from symbol table)
Change target to the next disassembled instruction
Ignore dead instruction

// Probability to insert dead code instruction = 0.33
if adding new dead code instruction:
choose dead code instruction randomly from table
add new dead code instruction to morphed
instruction list

// Probability to morph an existing instruction
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// if possible, is 0.33
If morphing:
Check substitution table for a suitable entry
if valid entry exists:
Add instructions to be substituted to
morphed instructions list
Recalculate virtual addresses

Reassembly:
Fix control flow in list of morphed instructions

Patch new binary:
Replace padding blocks from benign binaries
Create a new binary image
Write binary to disk

Propogate:
// This is for completeness only. A real worm uses exploits
‘‘rcp’’ or ‘‘scp’’ the new binary image to surrounding IP
addresses
6.5

Implementation
The worm is implemented to work on Linux on the Intel x86 64 architecture.

The programming language used to implement the worm is C. The compiler used to
build the worm is GCC, version 4.6.2 build 20111027 and the resulting format of the
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executable image of the worm is ELF64. This section explains implementation
details such as layout of the worm’s executable image, libraries used by the worm,
etc.

6.5.1

Libraries used

The worm only links directly to libc and libdl. The libraries dynamically
loaded during run-time are libbfd and libopdis. Libraries libc and libdl are part of
the core of any Linux distribution. Libbfd is part of the GNU Binutils [13] package,
and is usually found on most of the Linux distributions. Libopdis is an independent
library licensed under GNU LGPL as of version 1.0.4 [16]. Libopdis extends the
libopcodes library [13] by offering algorithms for linear and control-flow disassembly,
instruction and operand objects that are suitable for analysis.
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CHAPTER 7
Experiments

The effectiveness of the worm is evaluated using n-gram similarity [14],
similarity using graph technique [18] and HMM based detection [30].
For the worm to be effective in evading signature based detection, the worm
bodies in different generations of worm files must not be too similar to one another.
At the same time, the worm files must be similar to benign files so that they are not
easily distinguishable from benign files based on a similarity threshold [18].
An effective means of evading HMM based detection is to make the worms
statistically similar to benign binaries. This achieved by using long sequences of
instructions from benign executable files to fill the worm’s padding blocks. This is
in line with the HMM evasion technique [12] discussed in Section 5.4.
7.1

Test data
For each experiment, 100 generations of the worm are generated and 20 benign

files are selected. The list of benign files, and their corresponding file IDs used in
our test cases are shown in Table 7.1. From the 100 worms, 80 worms are chosen to
train the HMM. The remaining 20 worms and benign files are scored using the
trained HMM. The worm files in the test set are named MWOR 0, MWOR 1, . . .,
MWOR 19. The benign files are named BEN 0, BEN 1, . . ., BEN 19.
The padding blocks of the MWOR files are randomly chosen blocks of code
from one or more of the BEN files. Replacing the padding block randomly from the
chosen benign file set in Table 7.1 is part of the worm’s functionality.
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Table 7.1: Mapping from Benign file ID to actual executable file
Benign file ID
BEN 0
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9
BEN 10
BEN 11
BEN 12
BEN 13
BEN 14
BEN 14
BEN 15
BEN 16
BEN 17
BEN 18
BEN 19

Actual executable file
/usr/bin/as
/usr/bin/date
/usr/bin/dmesg
/usr/bin/file
/usr/bin/gcc
/usr/bin/size
/usr/bin/grep
/usr/bin/kill
/usr/bin/ld
/usr/bin/ldd
/usr/bin/mknod
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/nasm
/usr/bin/nm
/usr/bin/objdump
/usr/bin/readelf
/usr/bin/rm
/usr/bin/sleep
/usr/bin/strip
/usr/bin/systemctl
/usr/bin/touch

As part of the experiment, both n-gram and graph technique are used to
measure similarity between worms, between worms and benign files, and between
benign files. An HMM classifier trained using worm files in the training set, is used
to score benign files and worm files in the test set.
7.2

N-gram Similarity
The n-gram similarity technique [14] explained in Section 4.1 is used to

measure similarity between opcode sequences extracted from different generations of
the worm and from benign executable files. Since the objective here is to assess
whether common signatures can be extracted from worm executable files, the
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padding blocks are excluded from the assessment. When comparing these worm
bodies to benign files, a representative sample sequence of instructions, of length
equal to that of the worm body is chosen from the benign files.
Table 7.2 lists the similarity scores between consecutive generations of the
worm. The average similarity is 19.09%. Similarly, Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 list the
similarity scores between worms and benign files, and between worm files
respectively. The average similarity between worms and benign files is 13.98%, while
the average similarity between benign files is 26.35%.
Table 7.2: Similarity between MWOR files
File 1
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

File 2
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Similarity File 1
0.209329
MWOR 10
0.139122
MWOR 11
0.199484
MWOR 12
0.21417
MWOR 13
0.222563
MWOR 14
0.526146
MWOR 15
0.206423
MWOR 16
0.225307
MWOR 17
0.133635
MWOR 18
0.15623
Mean: 0.190862
Variance: 0.007521

File 2
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Similarity
0.167043
0.220303
0.170271
0.142834
0.133796
0.179309
0.120562
0.133473
0.126372

The similarity between worm generations can also be visualized graphically as
explained in Section 4. The similarity between the first and second generations of
the worm is illustrated by the graph in Figure 7.1. Examples of the other graphs
depicting the similarity between other consecutive pairs of worms are included in
Appendix C.
The n-gram similarity between worms, is somewhat lower than the similarity
between benign files. This can be attributed to the fact that, only the worm body is
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Table 7.3: Similarity between MWOR and benign files
File 1
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

File 2
BEN 0
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9

Similarity File 1
0.203112
MWOR 10
0.118454
MWOR 11
0.178677
MWOR 12
0.105231
MWOR 13
0.17498
MWOR 14
0.121704
MWOR 15
0.133385
MWOR 16
0.169622
MWOR 17
0.152165
MWOR 18
0.13086
MWOR 19
Mean: 0.139772
Variance: 0.001732

File 2
BEN 10
BEN 11
BEN 12
BEN 13
BEN 14
BEN 15
BEN 16
BEN 17
BEN 18
BEN 19

Similarity
0.234278
0.130494
0.125905
0.141814
0.068771
0.050677
0.123899
0.118309
0.181743
0.131365

Table 7.4: Similarity between BEN files
File 1
BEN 0
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9

File 2
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9
BEN 10

Similarity File 1
0.223816
BEN 10
0.176202
BEN 11
0.309048
BEN 12
0.248399
BEN 13
0.196715
BEN 14
0.227521
BEN 15
0.199912
BEN 16
0.240475
BEN 17
0.248165
BEN 18
0.265344
Mean: 0.263479
Variance: 0.006037

File 2
BEN 11
BEN 12
BEN 13
BEN 14
BEN 15
BEN 16
BEN 17
BEN 18
BEN 19

Similarity
0.212141
0.213142
0.399767
0.249333
0.190627
0.450179
0.215491
0.412275
0.327552

considered for similarity tests, rather than the whole worm. The same is true in the
case of worms versus benign files. The initial sections of the benign files, which are
not morphed, result in a higher similarity between benign files, as opposed to worm
versus benign files. However, low similarity of the worm body between different
generations of the worm, helps evade signature based detection.
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Figure 7.1: Similarity graph MWOR 0 vs MWOR 1
7.3

Similarity using graph technique
The graph technique to measure similarity [18] explained in Section 4.2 is used

to measure similarity between complete worm executable files, including padding
blocks. It is also used to compare the similarities between pairs benign files, and
pairs of worm files and benign files.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the similarity between worm files, benign files, and worm
and benign file pairs. The average similarity score for pairs of worm files is 0.592744.
The average similarity score for pairs of worms and benign files is 0.565945. The
average similarity score for pairs of benign files is 0.667563. As indicated by the
similarity scores in Figure 7.2, it is clear that it is not possible to obtain a threshold
that can be used to distinguish between the worm files and benign files.
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Figure 7.2: Similarity using graph technique

Table 7.5 lists the similarity scores between consecutive generations of the
worm. Similarly, Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 list the similarity scores between worms
and benign files, and between worm files respectively.
7.4

HMM
We now analyze the results of running the HMM detector on test data. As

indicated by previous research [12, 30], the number of states in the HMM does not
significantly impact the accuracy of classifier. Consequently, in this chapter, we will
only consider HMMs with two hidden states. Additional results for HMMs with
three states are presented in Appendix D.
The ratio of dead-code to worm-code, called the “padding-ratio”, is the ratio
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Table 7.5: Similarity using graph technique - MWOR files
File 1
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

File 2
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Similarity File 1
0.831699
MWOR 10
0.548553
MWOR 11
0.622553
MWOR 12
0.667299
MWOR 13
0.424688
MWOR 14
0.428372
MWOR 15
0.504638
MWOR 16
0.78983
MWOR 17
0.761414
MWOR 18
0.655345
Mean: 0.592744
Variance: 0.017882

File 2
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Similarity
0.64038
0.41586
0.638838
0.698381
0.727753
0.355481
0.487425
0.540405
0.523221

Table 7.6: Similarity using graph technique - MWOR and BEN files
File 1
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

File 2
BEN 0
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9

Similarity File 1
0.880288
MWOR 10
0.502868
MWOR 11
0.661706
MWOR 12
0.565231
MWOR 13
0.957393
MWOR 14
0.373347
MWOR 15
0.660952
MWOR 16
0.413928
MWOR 17
0.618177
MWOR 18
0.437322
MWOR 19
Mean: 0.565945
Variance: 0.028684

File 2
BEN 10
BEN 11
BEN 12
BEN 13
BEN 14
BEN 15
BEN 16
BEN 17
BEN 18
BEN 19

Similarity
0.433276
0.615871
0.381922
0.558548
0.34732
0.761746
0.665618
0.455879
0.675529
0.35198

of number of dead code instructions in the worm to the number of instructions that
correspond to the worm’s functionality. For example, a worm with twice as much
dead code as worm instructions will have a padding-ratio of 2.
We use an HMM with two states to score worms with padding ratio: 0.5, 1,
1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 and 4. Using these scores, we analyze the padding-ratio for which the
HMM detector starts to falter.
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Table 7.7: Similarity using graph technique - BEN files
File 1
BEN 0
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9

File 2
BEN 1
BEN 2
BEN 3
BEN 4
BEN 5
BEN 6
BEN 7
BEN 8
BEN 9
BEN 10

Similarity File 1
0.527698
BEN 10
0.665027
BEN 11
0.601069
BEN 12
1.295305
BEN 13
0.998744
BEN 14
0.936357
BEN 15
1.00245
BEN 16
0.770225
BEN 17
0.559742
BEN 18
0.276418
Mean: 0.667563
Variance: 0.068312

File 2
BEN 11
BEN 12
BEN 13
BEN 14
BEN 15
BEN 16
BEN 17
BEN 18
BEN 19

Similarity
0.528616
0.693015
0.462323
0.261346
0.696717
0.802703
0.787582
0.318344
0.500018

Figure 7.3 shows the result of scoring worms and benign files that are part of
the test data, using an HMM with two states. In this case, the generated worms
contain half as much dead code as the instructions that constitute the core
functionality of the worm.

Figure 7.3: HMM with N = 2, padding-ratio: 0.5
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The Log Likelihood Per Opcode (LLPO) scores for each of the MWOR files
and BEN files are shown in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8: LLPO scores - padding-ratio: 0.5, N=2
File
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
-2.887989
-2.953637
-3.254619
-2.955244
-2.933179
-2.93336
-2.930817
-3.248653
-2.864609
-2.993974
-3.063865
-2.868419
-2.898413
-2.784516
-2.934695
-3.044624
-2.91717
-2.758506
-2.859302
-2.890073

File
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
-2.462167
-2.409931
-2.447955
-2.614725
-2.604744
-2.488717
-2.491995
-2.448593
-2.501309
-2.575815
-2.388594
-2.456711
-2.471223
-2.424988
-2.502634
-2.488669
-2.493647
-2.385327
-2.381464
-2.515267

Figure 7.4 shows the scores for a padding-ratio of 2.5. The increase in
padding-ratio causes the LLPO scores of the worms to be closer to that of benign
binaries.
The same test is repeated for other padding ratios. The results of the test are
summarized in the ROC curve shown in Figure 7.5. The area under the curve
(AUC) is equal to the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen
positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one [5].
The AUC and standard error for each of the curves in the graph is shown in
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Figure 7.4: HMM with N = 2, padding-ratio 2.5

Figure 7.5: ROC Curves for different padding-ratios
Table 7.9. For a padding-ratio of 2.5, the area under the curve is 0.8325. At this
point the it is safe to assume the HMM detector starts misclassifying files with some
probability.
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Table 7.9: ROC AUC statistics for different padding-ratios
Padding-ratio
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
4.0

AUC
1
0.99
0.9625
0.9725
0.8325
0.8575
0.8225
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Standard Error
0
0.0105
0.03503
0.02112
0.06556
0.06225
0.06661

CHAPTER 8
Conclusion

The metamorphic worm described in this paper makes use of two morphing
techniques: equivalent instruction substitution and dead instruction insertion. This
is done in order to defeat signature-based detection. The worm also uses blocks of
dead code from benign executable files to evade HMM detection. This also helps in
making the worm executable files similar to benign executable files.
Results from the experiments show that it is not possible to obtain useful
detection results using an HMM-based detector when the added dead code is more
than 2.5 times the worm code. The HMM detector’s performance is acceptable for
padding-ratios up to 2.0. However, the probability of misclassification starts
increasing for padding-ratios 2.5 and above, as indicated by the ROC curves.
We measured similarity using n-gram technique and graph technique between
various combinations of benign executable files and worm files. The n-gram
similarity between worm bodies in different generations of the worm, is sufficiently
low to avoid extraction of a common signature, which can be used for
signature-based detection.
The average similarity scores measured using graph technique, between worm
file pairs, and between worm file and benign file pairs, are comparable to the
similarity scores of benign file pairs. Therefore, the worms cannot be distinguished
from benign files based on a similarity threshold.
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CHAPTER 9
Future work

One of the main techniques used by the metamorphic worm described in this
paper, is garbage instruction insertion. Use of garbage instructions is a proven
technique to defeat the HMM detector [12]. However, the instructions are inserted
randomly at feasible places and can be separated using more advanced
dead-instruction finding tools. Further research can be done on such tools which can
effectively detect functionally equivalent blocks of dead code.
Further research needs to be done on evaluating the effectiveness of
HMM-based detectors, when compiler generated blocks of non-functional code are
used for morphing.
The worm also uses simple morphing techniques. Further research can be
carried out on morphing engines which use more advanced morphing techniques,
while retaining the ability to be carried along with the malware.
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APPENDIX A
Equivalent instructions used by the worm

Table A.1: Equivalent instructions used by the worm
No.
1

Instruction
MOV IMM, %REG

2

MOV %REG1, %REG2

3

MOV %REG1, (%REG2)

4

MOV IMM, (%REG)

5

XOR %REG, %REG

Equivalent instruction(s)
XOR %REG, %REG
ADD IMM, %REG
OR
XOR %REG, %REG
SUB -IMM, %REG
XOR %REG2, %REG2
ADD %REG1, %REG2
MOV $0, (%REG2)
ADD %REG1, (%REG2)
MOV $0, (%REG2)
ADD IMM, (%REG2)
MOV $0, %REG

51

APPENDIX B
Dead code instructions used by the worm

Table B.1: Dead code instructions used by the worm
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Instruction
ADD $0, %RAX
ADD $0, %RBX
ADD $0, %RCX
ADD $0, %RDX
SUB $0, %RAX
SUB $0, %RBX
SUB $0, %RCX
SUB $0, %RDX
XOR $0, %RAX
XOR $0, %RBX
XOR $0, %RCX
XOR $0, %RDX
AND %RAX, %RAX
AND %RBX, %RBX
AND %RCX, %RCX
AND %RDX, %RDX
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APPENDIX C
Similarity Graphs

Figure C.1: Similarity graph - MWOR 1 vs MWOR 2
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Figure C.2: Similarity graph - MWOR 2 vs MWOR 3

Figure C.3: Similarity graph - MWOR 3 vs MWOR 4

54

Figure C.4: Similarity graph - MWOR 4 vs MWOR 5

Figure C.5: Similarity graph - MWOR 5 vs MWOR 6
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Figure C.6: Similarity graph - MWOR 6 vs MWOR 7
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APPENDIX D
Additional HMM results

• HMM parameters: N = 3, M = 131
• Worm to padding ratio: 2.0
• LLPO scores: Table D.1
• Lowest MWOR file LLPO: -2.555177
• Highest BEN file LLPO: -2.479824
• Graph: Figure D.1

Figure D.1: HMM with N = 3, worm-padding ratio 2.0

(1) HMM parameters: N = 3, M = 129
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(2) Worm to padding ratio: 3.0
(3) LLPO scores: Table D.2
(4) Lowest MWOR file LLPO: -2.541051
(5) Highest BEN file LLPO: -2.451643
(6) Graph: Figure D.2

Figure D.2: HMM with N = 3, worm-padding ratio 3.0

(1) HMM parameters: N = 3, M = 131
(2) Worm to padding ratio: 4.0
(3) LLPO scores: Table D.3
(4) Lowest MWOR file LLPO: -2.718673
(5) Highest BEN file LLPO: -2.451643
(6) Graph: Figure D.3
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Figure D.3: HMM with N = 3, worm-padding ratio 4.0
Table D.1: LLPO scores - Worm-padding ratio: 2.0, N=3
File
File
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
LLPO
-2.599386
-2.684883
-2.907455
-2.657581
-2.661491
-2.655631
-2.674456
-2.900707
-2.585162
-2.709333
-2.756476
-2.573857
-2.613086
-2.508351
-2.615704
-2.748886
-2.603163
-2.479824
-2.579598
-2.613378

File
File
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
LLPO
-2.512852
-2.529261
-2.499819
-2.555177
-2.492141
-2.456433
-2.425267
-2.470162
-2.47152
-2.37629
-2.427578
-2.412057
-2.383274
-2.381367
-2.511594
-2.42333
-2.477987
-2.49241
-2.427912
-2.533057

Table D.2: LLPO scores - Worm-padding ratio: 3.0, N=3
File
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
-2.544323
-2.64357
-2.843443
-2.608455
-2.625266
-2.619258
-2.62047
-2.84105
-2.515048
-2.669118
-2.689387
-2.526972
-2.576147
-2.478839
-2.567223
-2.690124
-2.558649
-2.451643
-2.515152
-2.560068

File
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
-2.402998
-2.486666
-2.504983
-2.541051
-2.4218
-2.517544
-2.382393
-2.395489
-2.49441
-2.393952
-2.380322
-2.444773
-2.421168
-2.325241
-2.527484
-2.453113
-2.353091
-2.486506
-2.45853
-2.434684

Table D.3: LLPO scores - Worm-padding ratio: 4.0, N=3
File
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN
BEN

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
-2.563521
-2.652861
-2.87828
-2.606329
-2.639205
-2.633219
-2.650461
-2.878112
-2.54517
-2.665605
-2.717854
-2.543789
-2.579349
-2.477433
-2.569425
-2.714744
-2.562329
-2.455398
-2.546387
-2.581043

File
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
MWOR
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

LLPO
-2.478913
-2.569835
-2.502876
-2.440894
-2.326988
-2.557039
-2.465314
-2.497504
-2.391017
-2.486907
-2.448817
-2.511273
-2.522425
-2.495827
-2.392941
-2.411323
-2.718673
-2.545033
-2.552821
-2.588134

APPENDIX E
Selected HMM Models

Table E.1: HMM matrices, N = 2 Worm-padding ratio: 2.0
HMM Parameters
N = 2, M = 131, T = 790441
π:
0.0000000000

1.0000000000

0.8874284727
0.0616794013

0.1125715273
0.9383205987

0.0000962463
0.0223048733
0.0001501143
0.0001358177
0.0117147309
0.0000500381
0.0000030630
0.0000000000
0.0001501143
0.0497101214
0.0001440348
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001165807
0.0002358939
0.0002823578
0.0001608367
0.0035955949
0.0001858558
0.0000929279
0.0000655234
0.0000857796
0.0018192423
0.0000718093
0.0001574846
0.1287337339
0.0000986223
0.0002358939
0.0002501905
0.0000142966
0.0000786313

0.0000060150
0.0987331347
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0357255629
0.0000000000
0.0000061549
0.0000019583
0.0000000000
0.0723558852
0.0065772642
0.0000058748
0.0000039166
0.0000908293
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000013070
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000331119
0.0000018366
0.0000000000
0.0000223376
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

A:

B:
adc
add
addsd
addss
and
bsf
bsr
bswap
bt
call
cdqe
clc
cld
cmova
cmovae
cmovb
cmovbe
cmove
cmovg
cmovge
cmovl
cmovle
cmovne
cmovns
cmovs
cmp
cpuid
cvtsi2sd
cvtsi2ss
cvttsd2si
cvttss2si

Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table E.1 – Continued
HMM Parameters
cwde
dec
div
divsd
divss
enter
fcmovnb
fild
fisttp
fld
fmul
fstp
fsub
fucomip
fxch
hlt
icebp
idiv
imul
in
inc
ja
jae
jb
jbe
je
jg
jge
jl
jle
jmp
jne
jnp
jns
jo
jp
js
ldmxcsr
lea
leave
lock
lods
loop
loope
loopne
mov
movabs
movapd
movaps

0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0003694867
0.0000714830
0.0000107224
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000008404
0.0000084592
0.0000142966
0.0000000000
0.0000076758
0.0000000000
0.0000071483
0.0000071483
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0007768793
0.0000144056
0.0001104452
0.0083456402
0.0042246453
0.0049823651
0.0064549149
0.1199091576
0.0046928589
0.0009828912
0.0025805363
0.0076379585
0.0383346104
0.0723836853
0.0000107224
0.0011747288
0.0000030633
0.0000107224
0.0035705758
0.0000000000
0.0212980591
0.0000128848
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000008308
0.0001644109
0.0000026619
0.2512854820
0.0009057861
0.0000536122
0.0000019070
Continued on Next Page. . .
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0.0000567900
0.0002898249
0.0002401287
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000391655
0.0000058748
0.0000112892
0.0000345307
0.0000000000
0.0000176245
0.0000075441
0.0000019583
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000391655
0.0000372072
0.0001351211
0.0012937144
0.0000371475
0.000088311
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0411913252
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000025974
0.0000120296
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000019583
0.0262488989
0.0005765067
0.0000744145
0.0000019583
0.0000073779
0.0000000000
0.0000690395
0.4841948314
0.0002184908
0.0000000000
0.0019023996

Table E.1 – Continued
HMM Parameters
movs
movsd
movss
movsx
movsxd
movzx
mul
mulsd
mulss
neg
nop
not
or
out
pop
push
rep
repnz
repz
ret
retf
rex
rol
ror
sar
sbb
seta
setae
setb
setbe
sete
setg
setge
setl
setle
setne
sets
shl
shr
sldt
stmxcsr
stos
sub
subsd
subss
test
ucomisd
ucomiss
xchg

0.0000000000
0.0007255524
0.0000929279
0.0016784643
0.0014446895
0.0252677456
0.0000422668
0.0000643347
0.0001143728
0.0004151083
0.0265848542
0.0005018279
0.0046880928
0.0000030457
0.0000000000
0.0003771502
0.0003791506
0.0000408011
0.0043506278
0.0007408776
0.0000000000
0.0000060341
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000172454
0.0013464675
0.0008113320
0.0000178707
0.0007219783
0.0000679088
0.0032238833
0.0001572626
0.0000571864
0.0000571864
0.0000428898
0.0030308792
0.0000071483
0.0000581400
0.0018454119
0.0000035741
0.0000000000
0.0001143245
0.0106511885
0.0000071483
0.0000393156
0.1085183416
0.0000428898
0.0001965782
0.0030175557
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0.0000469986
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0004472465
0.0218715853
0.0034297606
0.0000473400
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0003600451
0.0158442338
0.0011761312
0.0027716139
0.0000218306
0.0222518925
0.0203160941
0.0013158023
0.0006473755
0.0000014721
0.0118332996
0.0000019583
0.0000064853
0.0004797777
0.0003485732
0.0019762433
0.0000024991
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0207474139
0.0026822080
0.0000000000
0.0000019583
0.0000744409
0.0303884087
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0010706439

Table E.1 – Continued
HMM Parameters
xor
xorpd

0.0272213666
0.0000428898
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0.0694342484
0.0000000000

Table E.2: HMM matrices, N = 3 Worm-padding ratio: 2.0
HMM Parameters
N = 3, M = 131, T = 790441
π:
0.0000000000

0.0000000000

1.000000000

0.8612819278
0.0000012331
0.5001390860

0.1372622966
0.7801870820
0.4998609140

0.0014557756
0.2198116849
0.0000000000

0.0000828834
0.0234782893
0.0001345659
0.0001217501
0.0085665320
0.0000000000
0.0000128158
0.0000000000
0.0000580231
0.0104884193
0.0001669943
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002531120
0.0002070472
0.0002531120
0.0000776469
0.0029079862
0.0001323610
0.0000833027
0.0000532171
0.0000707234
0.0014605853
0.0000701355
0.0001431256
0.1070266756
0.0000287684
0.0002114607
0.0002242765
0.0000128158
0.0000704869
0.0000000000
0.0000099010
0.0000336322
0.0000582197
0.0000096118
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

0.0000105444
0.0912150386
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0350832625
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000025526
0.0000000000
0.0033310490
0.0083739393
0.0000076578
0.0000051052
0.0000000000
0.0000035163
0.0000000000
0.0000530054
0.0002511113
0.0000272827
0.0000000000
0.0000061011
0.0000049168
0.0001356193
0.0000385690
0.0000008383
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000740255
0.0003105508
0.0000000000
0.0000046682
0.0000000000
0.0000510520
0.0000076578

0.0000000000
0.1570662990
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0589494082
0.0001617223
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002759692
0.5345897198
0.0007661987
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0301889020
0.0003467898
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002685659
0.0024894014
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

A:

B:
adc
add
addsd
addss
and
bsf
bsr
bswap
bt
call
cdqe
clc
cld
cmova
cmovae
cmovb
cmovbe
cmove
cmovg
cmovge
cmovl
cmovle
cmovne
cmovns
cmovs
cmp
cpuid
cvtsi2sd
cvtsi2ss
cvttsd2si
cvttss2si
cwde
dec
div
divsd
divss
enter
fcmovnb
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Table E.2 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fild
fisttp
fld
fmul
fstp
fsub
fucomip
fxch
hlt
icebp
idiv
imul
in
inc
ja
jae
jb
jbe
je
jg
jge
jl
jle
jmp
jne
jnp
jns
jo
jp
js
ldmxcsr
lea
leave
lock
lods
loop
loope
loopne
mov
movabs
movapd
movaps
movs
movsd
movss
movsx
movsxd
movzx
mul

0.0000000000
0.0000010288
0.0000128158
0.0000000000
0.0000071958
0.0000032039
0.0000064079
0.0000064079
0.0000640790
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0006132673
0.0000167522
0.0000835692
0.0074812232
0.0037870689
0.0044663063
0.0057863337
0.1074893184
0.0042067863
0.0008466299
0.0023132519
0.0068468411
0.0656506094
0.0648863953
0.0000096118
0.0007665269
0.0000001864
0.0000096118
0.0032007460
0.0000032039
0.0159713702
0.0005994922
0.0000051874
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000042639
0.2228118157
0.0007338803
0.0000480592
0.0031142394
0.0000000000
0.0002950718
0.0000833027
0.0013002940
0.0012559968
0.0224119768
0.0000000000

0.0000153156
0.0000152854
0.0000000000
0.0000229734
0.0000095827
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000484994
0.0000000000
0.0015983244
0.0000453633
0.0000559938
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000274515
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0116690931
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002316631
0.0000177197
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0362829569
0.0000000000
0.0000397825
0.0000025526
0.0000102104
0.0000000000
0.0000884966
0.6235781612
0.0002167839
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000002543
0.0002830931
0.0000000000
0.0007457659
0.0284969571
0.0019835049
0.0000918937
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0.0000000000
0.0001581495
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0007970598
0.0006981240
0.0000000000
0.0003232233
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0773728756
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0018943892
0.0012809520
0.0002402252
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0005313732
0.0000000000
0.0430640170
0.0005893452
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002760874
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001975253
0.0121157674
0.0000000000

Table E.2 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulsd
mulss
neg
nop
not
or
out
pop
push
rep
repnz
repz
ret
retf
rex
rol
ror
sar
sbb
seta
setae
setb
setbe
sete
setg
setge
setl
setle
setne
sets
shl
shr
sldt
stmxcsr
stos
sub
subsd
subss
test
ucomisd
ucomiss
xchg
xor
xorpd

0.0000576711
0.0001025264
0.0004132444
0.0487322115
0.0001655860
0.0051077514
0.0000000000
0.0364064838
0.0335773960
0.0002909919
0.0000000000
0.0017800704
0.0200243835
0.0000000000
0.0000030712
0.0000042868
0.0000031970
0.0000170744
0.0007386885
0.0007272966
0.0000160197
0.0006471979
0.0000608750
0.0028381179
0.0001409738
0.0000512632
0.0000512632
0.0000384474
0.0027169496
0.0000064079
0.0002439713
0.0004962522
0.0000032039
0.0000032039
0.0001597281
0.0128469226
0.0000064079
0.0000352434
0.0972783254
0.0000384474
0.0001762172
0.0043416162
0.0259037597
0.0000384474

0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0003309115
0.0008141748
0.0010675424
0.0014539539
0.0000306312
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0012972864
0.0008088005
0.0000000000
0.0000002422
0.0000025526
0.0000000000
0.0005870880
0.0003717528
0.0023766679
0.0003763670
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000413051
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0264287036
0.0025269726
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0288366179
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000916833
0.0879810038
0.0000000000
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0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0004780444
0.0000000000
0.0031316466
0.0065058417
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0020672262
0.0002904841
0.0076519334
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000466851
0.0001578656
0.0003623200
0.0008963376
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0020933850
0.0085614955
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002327241
0.0368650112
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000158
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0060168932
0.0000000000

Table E.3: HMM matrices, N = 2 Worm-padding ratio: 3.0
HMM Parameters
N = 2, M = 129, T = 1054041
π:
1.0000000000

0.0000000000

0.8798421953
0.0679607327

0.1201578047
0.9320392673

0.0000623653
0.0227135425
0.0001785745
0.0001024178
0.0101517075
0.0000105044
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002074616
0.0507969274
0.0002427649
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001001587
0.0002337226
0.0002704879
0.0003256359
0.0036213866
0.0001654441
0.0001129221
0.0000459651
0.0001127475
0.0019932070
0.0001055527
0.0001024178
0.1283557032
0.0000394959
0.0002888706
0.0001864528
0.0000105044
0.0000604002
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0003908249
0.0000919134
0.0000078783
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

0.0000048299
0.0838085640
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0283808283
0.0000000000
0.0000118827
0.0000089120
0.0000000000
0.0820009550
0.0051029690
0.0000044560
0.0000029707
0.0001899159
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000022233
0.0000015841
0.0000000000
0.0000115949
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000103383
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000430749
0.0002257716
0.0003998185
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000297068
0.0000044560
0.0000089120

A:

B:
adc
add
addsd
addss
and
bsf
bsr
bswap
bt
call
cdqe
clc
cld
cmova
cmovae
cmovb
cmovbe
cmove
cmovg
cmovge
cmovl
cmovle
cmovne
cmovns
cmovs
cmp
cpuid
cvtsi2sd
cvtsi2ss
cvttsd2si
cvttss2si
cwde
dec
div
divsd
divss
enter
fcmovnb
fild
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Table E.3 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fisttp
fld
fmul
fstp
fsub
fucomip
fxch
hlt
icebp
idiv
imul
in
inc
ja
jae
jb
jbe
je
jg
jge
jl
jle
jmp
jne
jnp
jns
jo
jp
js
lea
leave
lock
lods
loop
loope
loopne
mov
movabs
movapd
movaps
movs
movsd
movss
movsx
movsxd
movzx
mul
mulsd
mulss

0.0000056207
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0005759725
0.0000104706
0.0001209957
0.0092202237
0.0052837055
0.0059297252
0.0069827898
0.1258372769
0.0040993361
0.0011607345
0.0021849120
0.0070221812
0.0264328267
0.0731735441
0.0000052522
0.0011003343
0.0000022305
0.0000131305
0.0039522748
0.0261441439
0.0000073980
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000002381
0.0001208004
0.0000016139
0.2556700975
0.0008012547
0.0000656524
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001582972
0.0000682785
0.0019355024
0.0015610365
0.0241815988
0.0000261068
0.0000814090
0.0000840351
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0.0000265277
0.0000059414
0.0000133681
0.0000089120
0.0000014853
0.0000029707
0.0000029707
0.0000519869
0.0000282215
0.0000891204
0.0010778717
0.0000282406
0.0000622738
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0563145109
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000091358
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0277409236
0.0004429029
0.0000564429
0.0000014853
0.0000058067
0.0000000000
0.0000525594
0.4798947462
0.0003503732
0.0000000000
0.0013724539
0.0000415895
0.0003471558
0.0000000000
0.0004529893
0.0177372853
0.0039893369
0.0001545625
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

Table E.3 – Continued
HMM Parameters
neg
nop
not
or
out
pop
push
rep
repnz
repz
ret
retf
rex
rol
ror
sar
sbb
seta
setae
setb
setbe
sete
setg
setge
setl
setle
setne
sets
shl
shr
sldt
stos
sub
subsd
subss
test
ucomisd
ucomiss
xchg
xor
xorpd

0.0002820293
0.0204647588
0.0003899404
0.0034646895
0.0000024414
0.0000000000
0.0002968426
0.0005232092
0.0000000000
0.0054341312
0.0001471499
0.0000000000
0.0000000050
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000069096
0.0018810120
0.0010425602
0.0000262610
0.0009322641
0.0000446436
0.0033640292
0.0001549397
0.0000315132
0.0000367653
0.0000236349
0.0024370173
0.0000078783
0.0000661565
0.0019120854
0.0000026261
0.0000490186
0.0099482600
0.0000052522
0.0000288871
0.1157478154
0.0000315132
0.0001444353
0.0025051041
0.0234487579
0.0000065047
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0.0005088850
0.0207444864
0.0011400180
0.0030073217
0.0000164432
0.0241991554
0.0227583229
0.0010483014
0.0005867092
0.0000144358
0.0123535208
0.0000014853
0.0000074239
0.0004010417
0.0002643905
0.0016210536
0.0000129568
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0172875844
0.0025902700
0.0000000000
0.0000287176
0.0266941826
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0014601974
0.0726254926
0.0000096890

Table E.4: HMM matrices, N = 3 Worm-padding ratio: 3.0
HMM Parameters
N = 3, M = 129, T = 1054041
π:
1.0000000000

0.0000000000

0.0000000000

0.8401558381
0.0871060187
0.0544288643

0.1184121543
0.8805817832
0.0613836061

0.0414320076
0.0323121981
0.8841875296

0.0000686927
0.0280699091
0.0002008214
0.0001151770
0.0112359283
0.0000118130
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002333073
0.0325833308
0.0002378837
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001009336
0.0002628398
0.0003041854
0.0003276320
0.0040670800
0.0001792889
0.0001269900
0.0000497627
0.0001186605
0.0021607049
0.0001138984
0.0001151770
0.1443463177
0.0000336036
0.0003248582
0.0002096812
0.0000118130
0.0000679249
0.0000000000
0.0000485819
0.0003450119
0.0001033640
0.0000088598
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

0.0000000000
0.0174225388
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0138288670
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000129127
0.0000000000
0.1354266373
0.0047539025
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000281084
0.0000000010
0.0000049308
0.0000000000
0.0000046268
0.0000000000
0.0000588935
0.0000012441
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000163412
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000025685
0.0000246204
0.0003707240
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000023113

0.0000149139
0.1893056150
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0508137537
0.0000000000
0.0000319014
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0023525599
0.0049387804
0.0000119630
0.0000079753
0.0005256663
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000073716
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000152347
0.0000000000
0.0000353103
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000120764
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001108831
0.0004949083
0.0005140745
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000797534
0.0000076803

A:

B:
adc
add
addsd
addss
and
bsf
bsr
bswap
bt
call
cdqe
clc
cld
cmova
cmovae
cmovb
cmovbe
cmove
cmovg
cmovge
cmovl
cmovle
cmovne
cmovns
cmovs
cmp
cpuid
cvtsi2sd
cvtsi2ss
cvttsd2si
cvttss2si
cwde
dec
div
divsd
divss
enter
fcmovnb
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Table E.4 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fild
fisttp
fld
fmul
fstp
fsub
fucomip
fxch
hlt
icebp
idiv
imul
in
inc
ja
jae
jb
jbe
je
jg
jge
jl
jle
jmp
jne
jnp
jns
jo
jp
js
lea
leave
lock
lods
loop
loope
loopne
mov
movabs
movapd
movaps
movs
movsd
movss
movsx
movsxd
movzx
mul
mulsd

0.0000000000
0.0000088875
0.0000118130
0.0000000000
0.0000065920
0.0000000000
0.0000059065
0.0000059065
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0006387832
0.0000123661
0.0001379581
0.0103688836
0.0059419521
0.0066684532
0.0078527090
0.1415141447
0.0046100334
0.0013053394
0.0024571094
0.0078970079
0.0221411910
0.0822895390
0.0000059065
0.0011172046
0.0000025507
0.0000147663
0.0044416529
0.0207468819
0.0000048021
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001358498
0.0000020400
0.2143872020
0.0008978493
0.0000738314
0.0027288090
0.0000000000
0.0001029955
0.0000767847
0.0019227582
0.0019069202
0.0262046980
0.0000280977
0.0000915510

0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000017796
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000730641
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0005153713
0.0000000000
0.0000300376
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0608761139
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000824689
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0374799817
0.0000000000
0.0000041588
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.5913503857
0.0001832596
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000602594
0.0005576681
0.0000000000
0.0004187492
0.0036603345
0.0025548983
0.0000086801
0.0000000000
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0.0000239260
0.0000677530
0.0000000000
0.0000325916
0.0000150251
0.0000039877
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000041878
0.0000757657
0.0002392601
0.0019508906
0.0000750190
0.0001089787
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0486305594
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000095080
0.0000244696
0.0000000000
0.0000040482
0.0167145260
0.0011938042
0.0001438256
0.0000039877
0.0000159507
0.0000000000
0.0001408015
0.2914029817
0.0006054355
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0007830236
0.0406323382
0.0073121624
0.0004005715
0.0000000000

Table E.4 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulss
neg
nop
not
or
out
pop
push
rep
repnz
repz
ret
retf
rex
rol
ror
sar
sbb
seta
setae
setb
setbe
sete
setg
setge
setl
setle
setne
sets
shl
shr
sldt
stos
sub
subsd
subss
test
ucomisd
ucomiss
xchg
xor
xorpd

0.0000945042
0.0002366660
0.0195140607
0.0004292780
0.0036517954
0.0000054794
0.0000000000
0.0006618863
0.0005787808
0.0000000000
0.0059393660
0.0002012314
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000230304
0.0020508079
0.0011724428
0.0000295326
0.0010484061
0.0000502054
0.0037831216
0.0001742421
0.0000354391
0.0000413456
0.0000265793
0.0027312174
0.0000088598
0.0004156036
0.0022834459
0.0000029533
0.0000513155
0.0106269804
0.0000059065
0.0000324858
0.1301007285
0.0000354391
0.0001624291
0.0026466208
0.0161896499
0.0000064034

0.0000000000
0.0005907692
0.0202251175
0.0000000007
0.0013136726
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0014835884
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000793049
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0006030007
0.0001579169
0.0000000000
0.0000217031
0.0145519773
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0013329123
0.0898088944
0.0000147027
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0.0000000000
0.0003802532
0.0229434617
0.0030730658
0.0059697802
0.0000404534
0.0649671000
0.0606559482
0.0000783925
0.0015751292
0.0002706657
0.0331170357
0.0000039877
0.0000199383
0.0010766706
0.0007098050
0.0041844685
0.0001219327
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000126987
0.0000000000
0.0448336949
0.0064816637
0.0000000000
0.0000420285
0.0454590987
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000904740
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0016807297
0.0423157229
0.0000000000

Table E.5: HMM matrices, N = 2 Worm-padding ratio: 4.0
HMM Parameters
N = 2, M = 131, T = 1317049
π:
0.9985471245

0.0014528755

0.4967575341
0.4597537055

0.5032424659
0.5402462945

0.0000367951
0.0547993781
0.0000661023
0.0000206925
0.0190965142
0.0000024473
0.0000055805
0.0000111953
0.0000948431
0.0731853855
0.0028501174
0.0000023837
0.0000014840
0.0000823310
0.0000736147
0.0001471997
0.0000909783
0.0014361536
0.0000714001
0.0000405580
0.0000240547
0.0000500548
0.0008673460
0.0000718731
0.0000347324
0.0515371734
0.0000189153
0.0001117871
0.0000409571
0.0000034505
0.0000153175
0.0000227074
0.0001377207
0.0003169465
0.0000369084
0.0000031685
0.0000144419
0.0000021302
0.0000041303

0.0000375784
0.0579618186
0.0000572977
0.0000275895
0.0186388023
0.0000021230
0.0000065252
0.0000101133
0.0000949696
0.0677838613
0.0030568097
0.0000021811
0.0000015501
0.0001064005
0.0000736814
0.0001459370
0.0000868770
0.0014165634
0.0000757046
0.0000414053
0.0000230649
0.0000574291
0.0008029283
0.0000810842
0.0000321982
0.0485093581
0.0000190427
0.0000867545
0.0000439466
0.0000026595
0.0000150649
0.0000213900
0.0001269911
0.0003540926
0.0000273043
0.0000029171
0.0000158648
0.0000024126
0.0000049443

A:

B:
adc
add
addsd
addss
and
bsf
bsr
bswap
bt
call
cdqe
clc
cld
cmova
cmovae
cmovb
cmovbe
cmove
cmovg
cmovge
cmovl
cmovle
cmovne
cmovns
cmovs
cmp
cpuid
cvtsi2sd
cvtsi2ss
cvttsd2si
cvttss2si
cwde
dec
div
divsd
divss
enter
fcmovnb
fild
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Table E.5 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fisttp
fld
fmul
fstp
fsub
fucomip
fxch
hlt
icebp
idiv
imul
in
inc
ja
jae
jb
jbe
je
jg
jge
jl
jle
jmp
jne
jnp
jns
jo
jp
js
ldmxcsr
lea
leave
lock
lods
loop
loope
loopne
mov
movabs
movapd
movaps
movs
movsd
movss
movsx
movsxd
movzx
mul
mulsd

0.0000141685
0.0000035138
0.0000069576
0.0000040950
0.0000007945
0.0000013759
0.0000015861
0.0000444187
0.0000148737
0.0000676179
0.0011402858
0.0000174705
0.0001124096
0.0030456559
0.0018727266
0.0019311099
0.0025497522
0.0523560313
0.0017213198
0.0005566059
0.0007592538
0.0027505774
0.0414677057
0.0288874261
0.0000016647
0.0004435686
0.0000053730
0.0000050735
0.0014141650
0.0000035979
0.0279573494
0.0002199441
0.0000309610
0.0000005859
0.0000026285
0.0000345714
0.0000245244
0.3930410177
0.0004675989
0.0000221904
0.0010165383
0.0000502519
0.0003220612
0.0000226994
0.0012568459
0.0111392407
0.0133626910
0.0000375296
0.0000254538
Continued on Next Page. . .
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0.0000161146
0.0000026015
0.0000067201
0.0000049765
0.0000007271
0.0000016489
0.0000014568
0.0000335194
0.0000140174
0.0000718953
0.0010969722
0.0000174567
0.0001079798
0.0028665454
0.0018124722
0.0017097344
0.0024056995
0.0460758585
0.0014582503
0.0005100005
0.0007927095
0.0024459807
0.0538642017
0.0282174391
0.0000013851
0.0004272941
0.0000052619
0.0000040826
0.0012070882
0.0000039777
0.0268732118
0.0002465663
0.0000269260
0.0000009177
0.0000034104
0.0000352511
0.0000299006
0.3871306459
0.0004867047
0.0000233152
0.0012797668
0.0000427197
0.0002607909
0.0000228502
0.0011110782
0.0106787844
0.0112336983
0.0000427190
0.0000232397

Table E.5 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulss
neg
nop
not
or
out
pop
push
rep
repnz
repz
ret
retf
rex
rol
ror
sar
sbb
seta
setae
setb
setbe
sete
setg
setge
setl
setle
setne
sets
shl
shr
sldt
stmxcsr
stos
sub
subsd
subss
test
ucomisd
ucomiss
xchg
xor
xorpd

0.0000172847
0.0003653912
0.0196748718
0.0011966786
0.0038876450
0.0000088417
0.0122520965
0.0142035825
0.0008245629
0.0005120233
0.0023332268
0.0071281524
0.0000008168
0.0000042149
0.0005261586
0.0001090077
0.0010894266
0.0007413612
0.0004151954
0.0000139731
0.0003812304
0.0000194379
0.0015104261
0.0000983457
0.0000185478
0.0000474728
0.0000150363
0.0011659902
0.0000036357
0.0089551704
0.0020773486
0.0000007113
0.0000032987
0.0000627205
0.0212834226
0.0000014974
0.0000070480
0.0465648092
0.0000119182
0.0000456744
0.0020071457
0.0547352782
0.0000144939
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0.0000190794
0.0003723104
0.0254666308
0.0010381879
0.0037187921
0.0000093576
0.0199183607
0.0186425878
0.0008115026
0.0004257781
0.0019337110
0.0098289848
0.0000007067
0.0000034140
0.0004695289
0.0001604875
0.0012872768
0.0006841036
0.0004009098
0.0000133872
0.0003825399
0.0000214711
0.0013356327
0.0000917697
0.0000179254
0.0000467115
0.0000153217
0.0011330593
0.0000024902
0.0096462016
0.0024057586
0.0000008031
0.0000042510
0.0000560284
0.0197007569
0.0000015378
0.0000080904
0.0429759322
0.0000094528
0.0000410899
0.0019729912
0.0503183741
0.0000129114

Table E.6: HMM matrices, N = 3 Worm-padding ratio: 4.0
HMM Parameters
N = 3, M = 131, T = 1317049
π:
0.0000000000

0.0000000000

1.0000000000

0.8440445378
0.0020971899
0.2700737983

0.1369401603
0.5243338837
0.4832011537

0.0190153020
0.4735689264
0.2467250480

0.0000768630
0.0219442537
0.0001499633
0.0000592448
0.0056939193
0.0000000000
0.0000148112
0.0000000000
0.0002314242
0.0080288331
0.0002383820
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0002314248
0.0001795857
0.0003573199
0.0001314191
0.0030921788
0.0001584909
0.0000999755
0.0000486198
0.0001271497
0.0017783231
0.0001012792
0.0000588429
0.1218090644
0.0000073423
0.0002406818
0.0001036783
0.0000074056
0.0000370280
0.0000000000
0.0000000004
0.0000138980
0.0000765486
0.0000074056
0.0000000000
0.0000000000

0.0000154039
0.0418087140
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0163670891
0.0000000080
0.0000000000
0.0000229204
0.0000000000
0.0040484733
0.0065649974
0.0000062093
0.0000041118
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000964306
0.0003939283
0.0000240330
0.0000000000
0.0000094885
0.0000041919
0.0002729279
0.0000981419
0.0000258632
0.0000000000
0.0000095105
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000599484
0.0002381938
0.0000022417
0.0000012175
0.0000000000
0.0000407058
0.0000062804

0.0000008589
0.1391768850
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0457075428
0.0000097197
0.0000000000
0.0000105699
0.0000000012
0.2803971111
0.0022401434
0.0000002920
0.0000002368
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000026736
0.0000752610
0.0000004247
0.0000000000
0.0000009475
0.0000011607
0.0000310218
0.0000009787
0.0000003125
0.0000000003
0.0000537751
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000029365
0.0002023263
0.0014093084
0.0000002694
0.0000000000
0.0000029950
0.0000001839

A:

B:
adc
add
addsd
addss
and
bsf
bsr
bswap
bt
call
cdqe
clc
cld
cmova
cmovae
cmovb
cmovbe
cmove
cmovg
cmovge
cmovl
cmovle
cmovne
cmovns
cmovs
cmp
cpuid
cvtsi2sd
cvtsi2ss
cvttsd2si
cvttss2si
cwde
dec
div
divsd
divss
enter
fcmovnb
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Table E.6 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fild
fisttp
fld
fmul
fstp
fsub
fucomip
fxch
hlt
icebp
idiv
imul
in
inc
ja
jae
jb
jbe
je
jg
jge
jl
jle
jmp
jne
jnp
jns
jo
jp
js
ldmxcsr
lea
leave
lock
lods
loop
loope
loopne
mov
movabs
movapd
movaps
movs
movsd
movss
movsx
movsxd
movzx
mul

0.0000005389
0.0000002058
0.0000074056
0.0000000000
0.0000041018
0.0000018514
0.0000037028
0.0000037028
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0006122794
0.0000088156
0.0000978800
0.0071982375
0.0044896415
0.0044266939
0.0060337079
0.1196614145
0.0038620174
0.0012977429
0.0018939807
0.0063077547
0.0644172341
0.0695847451
0.0000037028
0.0007647518
0.0000001955
0.0000111084
0.0031610721
0.0000092570
0.0163598218
0.0004008389
0.0000006591
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000002271
0.0000000000
0.1835068386
0.0006096951
0.0000555396
0.0028141258
0.0000000000
0.0000677987
0.0000555420
0.0019932330
0.0011773337
0.0252138044
0.0000000000

0.0000011504
0.0000051380
0.0000000000
0.0000184894
0.0000074992
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000787735
0.0000391792
0.0000063730
0.0017069258
0.0000369855
0.0000107109
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000001
0.0000000000
0.0000000316
0.0000000000
0.0000001003
0.0000000000
0.0000127123
0.0134160245
0.0000000782
0.0000000000
0.0003380045
0.0000142735
0.0000000000
0.0000264531
0.0000000000
0.0486691714
0.0000010553
0.0000008555
0.0000020111
0.0000084117
0.0000000000
0.0000641447
0.6817903164
0.0002853643
0.0000000027
0.0000000000
0.0001099191
0.0005323671
0.0000000000
0.0006513406
0.0251075494
0.0017584942
0.0001081539
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0.0000167704
0.0000567070
0.0000000000
0.0000010865
0.0000008759
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000456841
0.0000020718
0.0002887542
0.0011072843
0.0000029363
0.0002825873
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000005
0.0000000000
0.0000000009
0.0000000000
0.0000000677
0.0715801504
0.0000000024
0.0000000000
0.0000049546
0.0000006654
0.0000000000
0.0000006679
0.0000000000
0.0143699143
0.0002951972
0.0001208145
0.0000001866
0.0000001877
0.0001488236
0.0000192646
0.3080046846
0.0005383271
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000307737
0.0003110500
0.0000000000
0.0005616580
0.0063304003
0.0054858204
0.0000075057

Table E.6 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulsd
mulss
neg
nop
not
or
out
pop
push
rep
repnz
repz
ret
retf
rex
rol
ror
sar
sbb
seta
setae
setb
setbe
sete
setg
setge
setl
setle
setne
sets
shl
shr
sldt
stmxcsr
stos
sub
subsd
subss
test
ucomisd
ucomiss
xchg
xor
xorpd

0.0000591981
0.0000444336
0.0000958148
0.0448083873
0.0001164287
0.0043755194
0.0000000007
0.0396439971
0.0402901351
0.0003720701
0.0000000000
0.0051787613
0.0204153817
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0009545611
0.0009942010
0.0000333252
0.0009312535
0.0000499878
0.0034602637
0.0002314230
0.0000443831
0.0001147867
0.0000370280
0.0028010475
0.0000074056
0.0000000080
0.0006075657
0.0000018514
0.0000092570
0.0000570179
0.0114616550
0.0000037028
0.0000185140
0.1089427232
0.0000259196
0.0001055297
0.0041833547
0.0182797050
0.0000188458

0.0000000356
0.0000000000
0.0003869207
0.0111497760
0.0011825577
0.0019436983
0.0000242027
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0012545017
0.0010618879
0.0000000000
0.0001521154
0.0000020846
0.0000001596
0.0012890875
0.0002182096
0.0025773822
0.0008967517
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000002
0.0000000021
0.0000000573
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000001220
0.0000000000
0.0219096285
0.0012384284
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000700050
0.0201788585
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000001
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0006868617
0.0888314225
0.0000161514
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0.0000000277
0.0000000000
0.0008204500
0.0015285884
0.0027570567
0.0056111448
0.0000021314
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0009346186
0.0003806675
0.0000025438
0.0004823938
0.0000000748
0.0000159770
0.0001617761
0.0002489281
0.0011779151
0.0000037268
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000013
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000000220
0.0000000000
0.0064945917
0.0066612662
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000466967
0.0366383704
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0000471196
0.0000000000
0.0000000000
0.0001250157
0.0569142674
0.0000008157

